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The functional-organic distinction attempts to differentiate 
symptoms, signs and syndromes that can be explained by diag-
nosable biological changes from those that cannot1. It has been 
a central conceptual tool used to categorise cause and organise 
diagnosis in neuroscientific medicine2,3. It is cited as one of 
the main distinguishing characteristics of patients seen by, and 
referred to, psychiatrists and neurologists4. It remains one of 
the central organising principles in current diagnostic systems, 
despite efforts to deemphasise the distinction in recent years5.
The distinction has long been derided. In his landmark textbook 
of neurology, Wilson (1940)6 wrote that the functional-organic 
distinction “lingers at the bedside and in medical literature, 
though it is transparently false and has been abandoned long 
since by all contemplative minds”. More recently it has been criti-
cised for maintaining an artificial distinction between psychia-
try and neurology7, promoting naïve dualism in neuroscientific 
medicine1, promoting diagnostic incoherence8, and encouraging 
the continued stigmatisation of mental health problems9.
Although there has been much discussion of the required 
conceptual basis of the functional-organic distinction, much less 
has been written on how it is actually used in practice. Following 
a pragmatist approach to conceptual analysis in psychology and 
medicine10,11, we examine how the functional-organic distinction 
has been, and is, used in medical classification, by clinicians, 
and in research. We use this analysis to highlight inconsistencies 
and contradiction. We go on to illustrate the many roles the 
functional-organic distinction attempts to fulfil, and then suggest 
how future research programmes could address some of the 
practical and conceptual shortcomings we identify.
Historical shifts in the meaning of ‘functional’ and ‘organic’
Historically, the categories ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ have not 
retained a consistent meaning, scope, or relationship to diagnostic 
categorisation2,3,12. ‘Madness’ has been considered primarily 
‘organic’ or primarily ‘functional’ at different times or by 
different classification schemes, regardless of neurological 
findings13,14. Brain pathologies without structural lesions (such as 
seizures) have been included in both ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ 
categories2. More recently, neuropsychiatric disorders have 
been interpreted in the light of cognitive science, suggesting 
that syndromes could be explained by impairment to distinct 
levels of function – either information processing (functional) 
or implementation (organic)1,15,16.
Diagnostically, ‘organic’ has been used to label a specific 
syndrome of cognitive disturbance that explicitly excludes 
certain neurological disorders (as in the DSM-II diagno-
sis of “organic brain syndrome”) or categories of psychiatric 
syndromes akin to ‘functional’ diagnoses but accompanied by 
diagnosable neuropathology (e.g. “organic psychosis”). More 
recent diagnostic manuals have attempted to de-emphasise 
the functional-organic distinction although the changes 
are mostly cosmetic – by altering the terminology used to 
refer to ‘organic’ and changing how diagnoses are grouped. 
Psychiatric syndromes are now more commonly labelled as 
“secondary” to “disorders or diseases classified elsewhere” or 
“due to another medical condition” rather than ‘organic’ in both 
the DSM-5 and ICD although the implications are virtually 
identical.
Inconsistencies in the conceptual scope of the functional-
organic distinction
Although the functional-organic distinction is often cited as a 
tool used to differentially diagnose ‘organic’ from ‘non-organic’ 
disorders17, the terms ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ are clearly 
deployed in ways that indicate more complex scope when used 
in practice.
‘Functional’ is often used to indicate that there is no diagnos-
able pathophysiology sufficient to account for the aetiology 
of the symptoms – as implied by the use of the term ‘functional 
psychiatric disorder’. However, this applies to some diagnoses 
and not others, despite them being identical in this regard. 
For example, discussion of ‘functional psychosis’18 and ‘functional 
depression’19 but not ‘functional autism’ or ‘functional Tourette 
syndrome’.
Indeed, tic disorders are diagnosed solely on behavioural char-
acteristics, and, in fact, specifically require the exclusion of 
“underlying neurological disorder” (e.g. F95 Tic disorders, 
ICD-10) and so might be considered ‘functional’. However, 
‘functional’ or ‘psychogenic’ tics are considered to be a distinct 
category from tics diagnosed using tic disorder criteria which 
are considered ‘organic’20,21. This is also despite the exist-
ence of tic disorders that are attributed to the direct effects 
of neurological disorders such as traumatic brain injury22,23 
and stroke24,25. As currently used, ‘organic’ tic disorder refers to 
the diagnosis established through the orthodox diagnostic cri-
teria that excludes neurological damage, but also refers to tic 
disorder after acquired brain injury, while ‘functional’ refers to 
tic disorder without neurological damage but with atypical pres-
entation and ‘psychological’ causation. Here, the conceptualisa-
tion of ‘organic’ in tic disorders covers what would otherwise 
be considered ‘functional’ in other disorders.
One important use of ‘functional’ is to categorise disorders 
that appear ‘organic’ but aren’t26. For example, ‘functional 
neurological disorders’ are disorders that present similarly to 
neurological disorders but without evidence for impaired neu-
rophysiology in the individual patient that would explain the 
disability, indicating their aetiology is ‘not organic’27. However, 
the use of ‘functional’ more broadly to signal ‘not organic’ may 
solely refer to diagnosable damage to the nervous system, or 
may also include disorders that include damage to other bod-
ily systems. For example, the ‘functional erectile dysfunction’ 
indicates an erectile problem in the absence of neurological 
or vascular impairment28. Here, both uses of ‘functional’ imply ‘not 
organic’ but the scope to which ‘organic’ refers, differs.
With the rise of ‘functional neurological disorder’ as the pre-
ferred terminology for conditions previously labelled ‘hysteria’ 
or ‘psychogenic’29, authors have been increasingly careful to 
distinguish between functional disorders, malingering and 
other forms of illness deception30. Nevertheless, disability that 
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presents like neurological disorder but arises without diagnosable 
damage to the nervous system and is not under voluntary 
control (‘functional neurological disorder’), is still often grouped 
together with the faking of symptoms under the banner of 
‘functional’ syndrome or disorder31–33. Here, problems of markedly 
different causation, and indeed, a markedly different nature, are 
equally referred to as ‘functional’.
These cases illustrate that ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ are often 
used to indicate ‘not the other’, although the scope of the 
‘other’ varies greatly depending on the context of use.
Varying relationship to diagnostic practices that establish 
causality
The distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ is often treated 
as if the distinction is self-evident within diagnostic systems 
and is used as an unambiguous exclusion criteria in research 
(“Patients were excluded if they had an organic disorder”) 
and a maxim in clinical practice (“Always exclude organic 
causes of psychiatric symptoms”)34. In practice, however, this 
process can be far more complex, and far more uncertain, 
than such statements would suggest.
David17 has noted that “it is clear that the line of demarca-
tion between organic and non-organic psychiatric disorders is 
not hard and fast, and in a substantial number of cases there 
can be continuing uncertainty” although stresses that this 
is not an excuse to abandon “very real distinctions between 
classes of disorder”. Importantly, we are not arguing here 
for abandoning the functional-organic distinction as entirely 
incoherent or futile. Indeed, there are clearly problems that 
unambiguously arise as a result of diagnosable biological 
changes, and clearly those that arise without. Nevertheless, 
ambiguity is probably the rule rather than exception in many 
practical instances of differential diagnosis.
One of the central tasks in making this distinction is attribut-
ing causality. Even when disturbed physiology is identified, cli-
nicians then need to confidently identify it as the cause of the 
relevant signs or symptoms. Lishman’s criteria17 suggests 
that organic disorders are diagnosed on the basis of “a high 
probability that appropriate examination and investigation 
will uncover some cerebral or systemic pathology responsible 
for, or contributing to, the mental condition”. What counts as 
“high probability” here remains undefined and, often, largely 
unexamined. In fact, the extent to which diagnosable biological 
changes need to be established, or causality can be confidently 
attributed, varies significantly between disorders as an inherent 
consequence of their diagnostic criteria and the investigative 
methods that become relevant because of them.
Delirium, a confusional state involving disturbances to 
cognition, behaviour and emotion, has a varying relationship 
to diagnosed physiological change in diagnostic manuals. In 
the ICD-10, “F05 Delirium, not induced by alcohol and other 
psychoactive substances” is an organic disorder but requires 
no physiological findings for confirmation. If someone fulfils 
the criteria for delirium (“disturbances of consciousness 
and attention, perception, thinking, memory, psychomotor 
behaviour, emotion, and the sleep-wake schedule”) they have an 
organic disorder by definition. The DSM-5 definition of delirium 
lists similar symptoms but includes the specifier that “There 
is evidence from the history, physical examination, or 
laboratory findings that the disturbance is a direct physiological 
consequence of another medical condition” although does not 
state how to establish what counts as a “direct physiological 
consequence”. Diagnostically, delirium is defined in a way 
that implies its organic nature from its presentation to the point 
where, in one definition, no further investigation is necessary 
and in another, simply stating it should be a ‘physiological 
consequence’ is sufficient, despite the fact that the causes of 
delirium are typically nonspecific and multifactorial35.
In some cases, an organic basis for a disorder can be estab-
lished through a hypothetico-deductive approach. For example, 
a patient presenting with symptoms fulfilling a DSM-5 diag-
nosis of panic disorder and hypercalcemia may suggest the 
hypothesis that the anxiety symptoms are primarily caused by 
hyperparathyroidism, which can cause a disturbance in blood 
calcium levels and increase anxiety. If the anxiety symptoms 
resolve or reduce after high calcium levels are treated, a diag-
nosis of an organic anxiety syndrome is recommended36. Here 
a diagnosis is based on a mechanistic understanding of the 
pathophysiology, and an interventionist approach to hypothesis 
testing.
Other forms of ‘organic’ aetiology are established through 
apparent temporal relationship between the incident disturbance 
of the nervous system and the onset of psychiatric symptoms. 
Indeed, the psychoses of epilepsy are primarily diagnosed 
based on their temporal relationship to seizure events37 and 
substance-induced psychosis is primarily diagnosed based on its 
temporal relationship to drug use38. However, the extent to 
which the timing of these events can be confidently estab-
lished is likely to vary due to the reliability of the informants, 
and the difficulty with judging the onset of psychosis itself, 
potentially leading to a significant role of informed speculation 
in the diagnostic process to help account for uncertainty.
In contrast, some organic disorders are diagnosed on a more 
general process of inductive inference. As Gagnon et al.39 note, 
socially challenging or inappropriate behaviour is often diag-
nosed as organic personality disorder following a brain lesion 
without establishing that the particular lesion is causally 
responsible for the change or that personality difficulties were 
not present before the brain injury occurred. Evidence suggests 
that personality change can occur regardless of lesion location 
although personality change is more common in those with 
pre-frontal cortex lesions40. However, the process of attributing 
the cause to a specific lesion, rendering it ‘organic personality 
change’, is under-determined by the presence of a lesion itself. 
This is particularly in light of the wide range of biopsychosocial 
factors that can lead to personality change after the experience 
of brain injury41. In law, the process of attributing cause is 
conceptualised as the ‘but for test’ where causation is granted 
where the outcome would not occur ‘but for’ the injury, 
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although even with this depth of examination, considerable 
ambiguity can remain42. Hence, a diagnosis of ‘organic per-
sonality change’ requires a separation of ‘organic’ causes from 
‘psychological’ ones, before ordering them into a hierarchy of 
likely importance which can only be made on a ‘most likely’ 
basis.
Inconsistent use and interpretation in clinical practice
Considering there are no accepted criteria for distinguishing 
‘functional’ from ‘organic’ problems across diagnoses, nor 
are there reliable concepts to which the terms apply across 
all use cases, one question is how clinicians understand the 
terms and concepts they regularly use. Given the importance 
of the functional-organic distinction for diagnosis and the pri-
oritisation of treatment, it is perhaps surprising this has not been 
researched more widely. However, some existing studies have 
examined the question.
A mixed-methods study by Kanaan et al.26 asked neurologists 
what they understood by the term ‘functional’. Survey options 
included “Abnormal brain function”, “Abnormal body function”, 
“Psychiatric problem”, and “Not organic”. The results are 
reproduced in Table 1 but notably all options were considered 
to be valid meanings of ‘functional’ by at least 20% of 
respondents with “not organic” being the most frequently chosen 
with many respondents choosing several meanings.
An earlier study by Kanaan et al.43 conducted in-depth interviews 
with consultant neurologists about how they understood 
conversion disorder – perhaps the paradigmatic functional 
disorder for neurologists. They endorsed psychological models 
of causation but didn’t feel that it was their role to derive a 
psychological explanation and didn’t clearly distinguish invol-
untary symptoms from deliberately feigning and deception 
under this definition.
A survey by Mace and Trimble44 asked 168 British neurolo-
gists which terminology they preferred for syndromes that lack 
a physical explanation for the symptoms and also included a 
question on which syndromes should be classified as ‘func-
tional’. The top three responses covered a remarkably wide 
range and included “pseudoseizures” (68%) – episodes that 
typically resemble tonic-clonic seizures but without accom-
panying seizure activity in the brain, “anxiety neurosis” 
(62%) – psychiatric disorders of disabling anxiety, and 
“Munchausen’s syndrome” (61%) – a form of illness deception 
involving the conscious presentation of sham symptoms.
A survey of 391 Canadian psychiatrists and psychiatric resi-
dents by Benrimoh et al.45 asked respondents to give opin-
ions on the use of the phrase “organic causes” in their clinical 
work, and in psychiatry more generally. Over half of respond-
ents (55.9%) reported they used the phrase regularly. There was 
considerable variation in whether the phrase was considered 
stigmatising, implied dualism, or led to unhelpful treatment 
by the medical system. Indeed, while almost 56% of psychia-
trists reported using it regularly, far fewer (just under 30%) 
thought its use was appropriate. Many reported using it due to 
its assumed pragmatic function within the healthcare system, 
assuming, for example, that other clinicians would dismiss psy-
chiatric patients’ reports of physical health symptoms unless 
they communicated ‘organic’ causation on the patients’ behalf.
Although small in number, these studies suggest that clini-
cians do not have a clear or consistent conceptual basis when 
interpreting or deploying the terms ‘functional’ and ‘organic’, 
despite using them frequently.
Cultural perceptions and political uses
The functional-organic distinction has an important political 
dimension as attributing causes at the level of mind and body, 
to give a typical lay reading, or to ‘functional’ or ‘organic’, in 
its broader and more complex bio-medical application, imply 
very different things about the patient’s autonomy, responsi-
bility and deservedness with ‘organic’ disorders seen as more 
deserving of care and individuals less responsible for their 
predicament46,47. The distinction also affects the prestige of the 
illness, with ‘organic’ disorders considered more prestigious 
than ‘functional’ disorders by both professionals and the 
public48,49 and with the prestige conferred on relevant medical 
specialities tending to reflect this same hierarchy50.
The functional-organic distinction is also a basis for challeng-
ing medical authority. Challenges to the legitimacy of psychia-
try have frequently suggested that valid medical specialities are 
necessarily identified by their focus on ‘organic’ conditions51,52 
with some authors explicitly adopting the functional-organic dis-
tinction to argue against the legitimacy of psychiatric practice in 
Table 1. Responses to survey question by neurologists on the meaning of 
‘functional’ from Kanaan et al.26. This table is reproduced under the terms of the 
Creative Common Attribution Non-commercial 2.0 (CC BY-NC 2.0) license.
Selection
Proportion (%) 
choosing the selection 
at all
Proportion (%) of  those 
choosing only that 
selection
Abnormal brain function 127/349 (36%) 45/127 (35%)
Abnormal body function 77/349 (22%) 17/77 (22%)
Psychiatric problem 104/349 (30%) 29/104 (28%)
Not organic 216/349 (62%) 128/216 (59%)
Page 5 of 19
Wellcome Open Research 2020, 5:138 Last updated: 21 JUL 2020
the domain of ‘functional’ diagnoses53,54 although seemingly 
without a critical insight into the difficulties inherent in this 
distinction itself. Similarly, most debates over the legitimacy of 
syndromes included under the broad category of ‘medically 
unexplained symptoms’ tend to involve grassroots patient pres-
sure to accept a largely or solely ‘organic’ explanation for the 
symptoms55. Examples where patients lobby for non-organic 
explanations of controversial syndromes are far harder to come by.
Implications
The functional-organic distinction is unhelpfully linear and 
unhelpfully static
One of the notable things about the functional-organic distinction 
is its implied commitment to ‘zero sum’ causality1. ‘Functional’ 
and ‘organic’ aetiology is conceived as if attributing more 
‘organic’ causality necessarily implies the attribution of less 
‘functional’ causality. This is apparent in the concept of 
“functional overlay”56,57 where a certain proportion of the total 
presentation is attributed to either ‘organic’ or ‘functional’ 
aetiology, and the wide-ranging discussion of differential 
diagnosis between syndromes apparently on either side of 
the aetiological distinction58–60. These diagnostic categories 
imply syndromes exist in “purely functional” or “purely 
organic” equivalents, presumably representing the far ends of a 
functional-organic spectrum.
This conceptualisation largely rejects a dynamic relationship 
between neurological disorder, experience, behaviour, and context. 
This is despite the fact that the interaction between neurocogni-
tive capacity, perception, affect, action, and context is perhaps 
one of the central assumptions of the neurocognitive 
sciences61–65. These dynamic considerations become starker 
still when considering the range of difficulties likely to be 
analysed in terms of potential ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ 
components. While functions like memory may provide a rela-
tively straightforward case (and are clearly complicated enough 
as they are), emotional responses and related psychiatric 
disorders become more complex still.
Taking depression as an example, it is very likely that the risk 
of depression after stroke is raised by damage to brain circuits 
involved in the control of emotion66 and although there may be 
instances of post-stroke depression which are almost entirely 
accounted for these brain changes, the causal factors for the 
majority of patients are likely to include a dynamic interac-
tion between personal, social and neuropathological factors67–69. 
Here, it is clear there is a marked disconnect between the best 
available science on the causes of depression after neurologi-
cal disorder and the extent to which the functional-organic 
distinction can encapsulate these complex causal pathways, 
either through formal diagnoses or as a way of ‘apportioning 
causality’.
Current diagnostic technology defines the limits of the 
functional-organic distinction
Another limitation of the functional-organic distinction is its 
reliance on clinical diagnostic technology as an arbiter of what 
is considered ‘organic’. Consequently, its limits lie within the 
extent to which this technology can detect neuropathology on 
an individual basis, rather than the best available science on 
likely causation.
In several instances, we know that damage to the nervous sys-
tem is a major contributor to causality but because clinical diag-
nosis is unable to measure its presence, the relevant syndromes 
are rarely considered ‘organic’. For example, Haag et al.’s70 
review of brain injury in women subject to intimate partner 
violence report a prevalence of between 19% and 75% – most 
commonly in the form of mild traumatic brain injury where no 
changes can be detected on diagnostic neuroimaging. However, 
brain changes can be detected in group studies as altered 
cognition and disturbed functional connectivity71. More generally, 
the neuropathological contributions to mild traumatic brain 
injury have been well-established72 and the increased risk of 
mental health problems confidently identified73. Nevertheless, 
the mental health consequences of intimate partner violence are 
almost always conceptualised in terms of social and emotional 
causality, with no mention of brain injury74,75. Importantly, 
this is not simply a matter for researchers and the develop-
ment of better theoretical models. A clinician who is presented 
with someone who has mental health problems for which 
mild traumatic brain injury has been a significant causal 
factor will be unable to confidentially establish any ‘organic’ 
changes through neurological examination because such damage 
does not lead to neuropathology than can be currently detected 
on an individual basis76.
It is also worth noting the reverse scenario, where clinical 
diagnostics regularly result in evidence for neuropathology 
that is often dismissed as aetiologically irrelevant despite good 
evidence that it is a risk factor for poor functioning and poor 
mental health. For example, clinically abnormal computed 
tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imagining (MRI) 
findings are present in high proportions of individuals with first 
episode psychosis (64.2%77; 17.6%78; 19.2%79). The vast majority 
of these findings are small but detectable pathologies, 
typically white matter hyperintensities, that are frequently 
dismissed as ‘not clinically relevant’. This is despite the fact that 
exactly these changes have been found to predict mental health 
problems, poor outcome for mental health problems80–83 and 
poor cognition84 in otherwise neurologically unaffected adults 
across the lifespan.
We note psychosis is typically considered a ‘functional’ 
disorder, a framing which we speculate might at least partly 
account for why such clinical neurological findings are more 
likely to be dismissed in terms of explaining causality. But 
we also note the criterion for which abnormal findings were 
considered ‘organic’ and aetiologically relevant to psychosis 
in these studies77–79, namely that they were of a nature that 
‘changed clinical management’ – presumably leading to a referral 
to neurologists for additional treatment. Here, ‘organic’ is not 
signifying the best evidence for likely causality but indicating a 
need to change clinical management.
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Social power in definition and application
Epistemic and testimonial injustice refers to the situation 
where a person’s testimony and the credibility of their claims 
are questioned on the basis of negative stereotypes85. Kidd and 
Carel86 have cited ill persons as particularly likely to be subjec-
tive to testimonial injustice, due to wide-ranging stereotypes 
about the effect of pathologies on individuals. Neurological 
disorders can obviously affect the accuracy of someone’s 
testimony (for example, through memory deficits). However, as 
Kidd and Carel note, this does not change the fact that 
people with neurological disorders may still be subject to unjus-
tified dismissals of valid concerns based on inaccurate ideas 
about personal unreliability.
We note here the significant potential for epistemic injustice 
given common stereotypes about ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ 
illnesses in terms of autonomy, responsibility and deservedness46. 
Research on carer and professional perceptions of ‘challenging’ 
behaviour in survivors of brain injury show clear evidence 
for the active construction of the causes of behaviour87,88. 
Here, the extent to which the person’s troubling behaviour is 
given a ‘brain injury’ or ‘intentional’ explanation depends 
heavily on the motivations of the individual doing the inter-
pretation. Huet et al.89 reported exactly this process of active 
interpretation by health professionals who tended to reframe 
aggressive and angry behaviour as involuntary, thereby maintain-
ing a ‘good person’ understanding of the patient. However, this 
interpretation also has the potential to erase any valid frustra-
tions or concerns that may have motivated the behaviour and 
renders the individual socially inert.
Although not widely researched, we note that the concept of 
‘inappropriate’ or ‘challenging’ behaviour relies heavily on 
social and cultural norms and has the potential to raise impor-
tant ethical issues. Cases of changes in sexual preference and 
sexual orientation after brain injury have been interpreted in 
terms of pathological alteration to the brain circuits mediating 
sexual preference90. But it is also possible that the brain injury 
altered the capacity to strategically inhibit pre-existing desires, 
or that the change was a conscious decision after an impor-
tant life event, although these latter interpretations require a 
starker form of social attribution that may involve re-evaluating, 
rightly or wrongly, the person in question, depending on others’ 
approval of their new behaviour. We note that changes subject 
to fewer prejudices and typically seen in more benign light, 
such as a sudden interest in producing art after brain injury, 
are usually explained in terms of ‘disinhibition’91,92 which has 
the function of attributing the new socially acceptable activity 
to the ‘self’ rather than to pathology, which has simply 
‘released’ it.
Common to these accounts is that the testimony of patients 
features little in the explanation of the behaviour and we 
suggest that this situation occurs frequently in the process of 
providing both clinical accounts and scientific explanations. 
Furthermore, we also note that the testimony of people 
affected by neurological and neuropsychiatric conditions is 
almost entirely absent from the scientific and clinical debates 
that have formed the conceptual basis of the functional-organic 
distinction. Here, we argue that inclusion of first-person 
perspectives is essential to inform several important areas of 
practice and scientific understanding.
Firstly, it would inform clinical work in terms of better under-
standing the process of being subject to the functional-organic 
distinction, how it is perceived, experienced and understood 
by patients. Secondly, in terms of scientific understanding, 
it would provide a phenomenology of experience to better 
understand the interaction between, for example, injury and 
autonomy. These approaches are now commonplace in psychiatry, 
where understanding experience is considered to be a central 
component in advancing the development and delivery of 
health care systems93 and where understanding subjective expe-
rience informs neuropsychological theories of causation94. 
Although some studies have been conducted on the 
experience of health care, as far as we know, no research has 
ever been conducted with, for example, survivors of brain injury 
that aims to inform the science of how neurological-level and 
personal-level processes interact.
It is also the case that the priorities of people who use 
healthcare systems may differ markedly from the priorities 
of healthcare systems themselves. Similarly, the research pri-
orities of researchers and patients have been found to differ 
substantially95. We note here that the functional-organic dis-
tinction is a conceptual tool developed by medicine to try and 
solve a particular set of problems, but one important focus 
of research should be to investigate how well these problems 
actually map onto the priorities of those seeking help.
Conclusions
Before tackling the question of what the functional-organic 
distinction is doing in psychiatry and neurology, it is perhaps 
worth noting what it is not doing. It is not reliably 
distinguishing between aetiology at different levels (physi-
ological, psychological etc) across contexts. Indeed, the extent 
to which it can reliably distinguish between types of causes for 
particular signs, symptoms and syndromes seems to dif-
fer depending on the signs, symptoms and syndromes being 
assessed. In some cases, conceptual inconsistencies and dif-
ficulties with practical diagnosis render this an ambition rather 
than a reliable outcome, partly due to the multiplicity of mean-
ings represented by the terms themselves. Rather than a general 
distinction, it is more akin to various local distinctions, 
each defined and limited by context.
Importantly, it seems that one of the major functions of this 
distinction is to provide a justification and language to allow 
clinicians to prioritise healthcare interventions. Indeed, con-
sidering the complex nature of neuropsychiatric disorders 
where causes are likely dynamic, reciprocal and span levels of 
explanation, the functional-organic distinction often seems 
like a tool that helps determine treatment priority dressed up 
in the language of causation. To reiterate, it is clear that there 
are syndromes almost entirely accounted for by diagnosable 
pathophysiological changes, and those that are not, but most 
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